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The  paper  studies  two-person  supergames.  Each  player  is restricted  to  carry  out 
his  strategies  by finite  automata.  A  player’s  aim  is to  maximize  his  average  payoff 
and  subject  to  that,  to  minimize  the  number  of states of his  machine.  A  solution  is 
defined  as a pair  of machines  in  which  the  choice  of machine  is optimal  for  each 
player  at every  stage  of the  game. Several properties  of the  solution  are  studied  and 
are  applied  to  the  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma.  In  particular  it  is  shown  that 
cooperation  cannot  be the  outcome  of a solution  of the  infinitely  repeated  prisoner’s 
dilemma.  Journal  of Economic  Literature  Classification  Numbers:  Oil,  022,  026. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  the  fifties  Simon  pointed  out  the  importance  of “bounded  rationality” 
to  economic  theory  (see  Simon  [lo,  111).  Although  Simon’s  ideas  have 
received  worldwide  recognition  we  still  find  Simon  pointing  out  “...  an 
urgent  need  to  expand  the  established  body  of economic  analysis,  which  is 
largely  concerned  with  substantive  rationality,  to  encompass  the 
procedural  aspects  of  decision  making”  [ll,  p.  5061,  The  reasons  why 
Simon’s  work  has  had  a limited  impact  on  economic  theory  are  quite  clear: 
it  is difficult  to  embed  the  procedural  aspects  of decision  making  in  formal 
economics  models  and  we do  not  possess a  unique  natural  theory  describ- 
ing  these  aspects.  As  economists  we are  confronted  with  a  choice  between 
waiting  for  a  satisfactory  description  of  the  procedure  of  human  decision 
making  and  analyzing  somewhat  artificial  models  capturing  certain 
elements  of “bounded  rationality.”  I  prefer  the  latter. 
The  term  “bounded  rationality”  was used  to  cover  a wide  range  of issues. 
* Some  of the  work  on  this  paper  was  done  while  I  visited  the  Institute  for  International 
Economic  Studies  at  the  University  of Stockholm  in  August  1983.  I  am  grateful  to  this 
Institute  for  its  hospitality.  I  benefited  from  the  many  discussions  with  Ken  Binmore.  Ed 
Green,  Charles  Wilson,  and  Asher  Wolinsky,  whom  I would  like  to  thank.  I would  also  like  to 
thank  Doug  McManus  and  Cathy  Weinberger  for  their  editorial  comments. 
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Therefore  I  would  like  to  emphasize  that  I  deal  here  only  with  one  specific 
procedural  aspect:  rules  of  behavior  are  costly  to  operate  and  decision 
makers  aim  to  minimize  these  costs.  Thus,  for  example,  I  do  not  deal  with 
the  costs  of computing  optimal  behavioral  rules. 
The  cornerstone  of  the  model  is  a  two-person  supergame.  In  the 
supergame,  a game,  G, is  repeated  sequentially  an  infinite  number  of times. 
At  each  repetition  each  player  chooses  a one  period  G-strategy,  the  choice 
of which  may  depend  on  the  outcome  in  the  previous  periods.  At  the  end  of 
each  period,  the  players  receive  the  one  period  G-payoffs.  Streams  of 
payoffs  are  evaluated  according  to  the  criterion  of the  limit  of the  means.  A 
supergame  strategy  is a plan  how to  play  G  at  every  period,  conditional  on 
every  possible  history. 
There  are  three  reasons  for  my  choice  of a supergame  as the  fundamental 
component  of this  model: 
(a)  The  supergame  has  already  been  intensively  analysed. 
(b)  The  set of supergame  strategies  has  a  natural  internal  structure. 
(c)  We  have  strong  intuitions  about  the  relative  complexity  of 
supergame  strategies. 
This  helps  us  to  test  the  plausibility  of  the  forthcoming  definition  of  the 
complexity  of a strategy. 
Our  first  departure  from  the  standard  treatment  of the  supergame  is  in 
the  strategy  spaces. A  player  is  required  to  play’the  repeated  game  using  a 
kind  of finite  automaton  called  a  (Moore)  machine.  A  machine  consists  of 
a finite  set of states,  one  of them  an  initial  state,  an  output  function,  and  a 
transition  function.  Given  that  the  machine  is  at  the  state  qr  in  the  tth 
round  of the  repeated  game,  the  output  function  determines  the  one-shot 
game  strategy  that  the  player  plays  as a  function  of  the  element  qt.  The 
transition  function  determines  the  state  q’+’  as a  function  of  the  state  qf 
and  of the  opposing  player’s  move  at  period  t. 
Finite  automata  have  been  used  for  the  study  of  computer  operation. 
Sometimes  brain  functioning  is  modeled  as a  finite  automaton.  However, 
the  question  of whether  a finite  automaton  is a  reasonable  way  to  model  a 
decision  maker  is  certainly  central  to  the  evaluation  of the  current  study. 
There  is  an  artificial  element  in  the  description  of a  player’s  behavior  as a 
machine.  In  the  absence  of  a  more  estabhshed  tool  to  model  a  decision 
maker  I  believe  Moore’s  machine  to  be  a reasonable  tool  for  formalizing  a 
player’s  behavior  in  a  supergame. 
If  we just  constrain  the  players  in  a supergame  to  choose  only  machines 
(rather  than  supergame  strategies)  we  still  get  an  extensive  set  of  Nash 
equilibrium  payoffs.  This  set includes  all  individually  rational  payoffs  which 
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Here  comes  the  second  departure  from  the  standard  supergame  model. 
The  players  are expected  to  take  into  consideration  not  only  the  supergame 
payoffs,  but  also  the  complexity  of the  machines  they  use. Therefore,  before 
proceeding,  we must  formalize  the  notion  of complexity.  The  formalization 
of  this  notion  was  a  central  topic  in  the  theory  of  automata.  Several 
sophisticated  measures  have  been  suggested  in  the  literature.  It  seems  that 
considerable  work  is  needed  to  construct  complexity  measures  that  are 
relevant  in  economic  contexts.  Obviously  the  measure  of complexity  has to 
be  carefully  matched  to  the  interpretation  given  to  the  ““machines.” 
The  formalization  I  am  using  in  this  paper  is fairly  naive. 
the  number  of states  in  the  machine.  To  be  more  precise,  imagine  that  the 
players  bear  the  cost  of maintaining  the  states  of the  machine.  Each  period 
a  player  has  to  pay  a  “small”  fee for  each  of  the  states  maintained  in  his 
machine.  He  pays  the  fee for  every  state  he  chooses  to  keep  in  his  machine 
regardless  of the  frequency  of  its  usage.  I  will  refer  to  these  costs  as  the 
n~airztenance  costs  of the  machine. 
As to  the  tradeoff  between  maintenance  costs and  the  supergame  payoffs 
I  have  studied  here  a  limit  case:  the  maintenance  costs  are  infinitesimal. 
The  players  care  primarily  about  the  average  payoff  and  they  care 
lexicographically  only  secondarily  about  the  maintenance  costs. 
The  complexity  notion,  the  definition  of  maintenance  costs,  and  the 
trade-off  between  the  maintenance  costs  and  the  supergame  payoff  will 
induce  the  definition  of the  solution  for  the  model.  A  solution  (called  semi- 
perfect-equilibrium)  is  a  pair  of  machines,  one  for  each  of  the  players, 
which  satisfies  at  every  stage  of the  game: 
(a)  Neither  of  the  players  can  achieve  a  higher  average  payoff  by  a 
unilateral  change  of his  own  machine. 
(b)  Neither  of the  players  is  able  to  reduce  the  number  of the  states 
used. 
This  paper  concentrates  on  the  classical  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma. 
(For  a reference  to  the  importance  of the  game  in  the  development  of game 
theory,  see Lute  and  Raiffa  [6].)  Figure  1 describes  the  one-shot  prisoner’s 
dilemma. 
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FIGURE  2 
The  only  Nash  equilibrium  of  the  one-shot  game  is  (D,  D).  In  the 
repeated  game  (with  the  limit  of  the  means  evaluation  criterion),  any 
feasible  and  individually  rational  payoff  is  a  repeated  game  payoff  of  a 
Nash  equilibrium  (the  Folk  theorem)  and  in  fact  even  of  a  perfect 
equilibrium  (for  the  study  of the  perfect  equilibria  of the  repeated  games 
see Rubinstein  [9]  and  the  references  there). 
In  contrast,  it  will  be  shown  here  that  a  repeated  game  payoff  of  a 
solution  must  be  either  (0,O)  or  an  internal  point  on  the  segment  combin- 
ing  (0,2)  and  (2,O).  (See  Fig.  2.)  The  cooperative  payoff  vector  (2,2)  is 
not  achieved  by  a  solution. 
Thus  the  current  paper’s  approach  is  very  different  from  that  of  three 
previous  bounded  rationality  studies  of  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  in  which 
cooperation  is explained  by  “bounded  rationality.”  Radner  [S]  applied  the 
c-equilibrium  concept  to  a  finitely  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma.  Under  the 
title  “Can  Bounded  Rationality  Resolve  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma?”  he 
showed  that  the  players  can  come  “close”  to  the  vector  payoff  (2,2)  by 
using  a  pair  of  strategies  which  will  be  “almost”  the  best  response  of  one 
against  the  other. 
Smale  [12]  incorporates  a  bounded  memory  assumption.  The  players 
can  retain  in  their  memory  only  some  kind  of average  of the  past  payoffs, 
and  their  strategies  should  be  “good”  in  a well-defined  way  which  captures 
a  notion  of  bounded  rationality.  Again,  the  payoff  (2,2)  is  established  as 
the  solution’s  payoff. 
The  closest  to  this  paper  is Green  [4].  Green  studies  the  finitely-repeated 
prisoner’s  dilemma.  He  assumes  that  the  players  use  a  restricted  class  of 
strategies.  The  use of a strategy  is  associated  with  a cost.  Green’s  choice  of 
the  restricted  class of strategies  and  of the  costs is motivated  by  an  intuitive 
argument  in  which  a  strategy  is  replaced  by  a  Turing  machine,  and  the 
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The  idea  that  finite  automata  theory  may  be  useful  for  modelling  boun- 
ded  rationality  in  economic  contexts  is  not  new.  Marschak  and  McGuire 
make  this  suggestion  in  unpublished  notes  [7].  Aumann  [ l]  suggests  the 
use of finite  automata  in  the  context  of  repeated  games  (see Aumann  [l: 
p. 211. 
I  am  aware  of  some  studies  of  the  complexity  of  multi-stage  decision 
processes. Futia  [2]  concentrates  on  applications  of an  algebraic  approach 
for  complexity  due  to  Rhodes.  (See Futia  [2]  and  the  reference  there.)  This 
measure  is quite  sophisticated  but  complicated.  It  enables  Futia  to  draw  a 
few conclusions  on  the  complexity  of  some  stopping  rules  for  sequential 
search  problems.  Varian,  in  an  unpublished  work  Ct3],  applied  the 
algebraic  automata  theory  approach  to  social  decision  theory.  We also  uses 
the  number  of  states  as  a  measure  of  complexity  of  a  social  welfare  rule. 
For  other  references  see Gottinger  [3]. 
Following  presentation  of  the  model,  I  define  the  solution  (Sect.  2). 
then  present  some  results  regarding  the  structure  of a solution  for  a general 
supergame  (Sect.  3)  and  apply  the  results  to  the  special  case of the  repeated 
prisoner’s  dilemma  (Sect.  4).  I  refrain  from  any  final  conclusions.  By  all 
accounts  this  work  should  be  considered  only  a  small  step  forward  on  a 
very  long  path.  I  have  my  own  doubts  about  some  of  the  details  of  the 
model.  Even  so I  hope  that  the  paper  will  serve  as a demonstration  of the 
scope  of  the  formal  approach  for  the  study  of  “bounded  rationality” 
elements  in  the  framework  of “game  theory-.” 
2.  THE  MODEL 
2.1.  The Supergame 
Let  G =  (S,,  &,  ul,  ul)  be a two  person  game  in  normal  form,  where  5’: 
is a finite  set of strategies  for  player  i and  ui:  S,  x S2 -+  R  is player  i’s payoff 
function. 
The  supergame  of  G  consists  of an  infinite  sequence  of repetitions  of G 
taking  place  at  periods  t =  1, 2, 3,....  At  period  t  the  players  make 
simultaneous  moves  denoted  by  sf~  Si  and  then  each  player  learns  his 
opponent’s  move.  A  supergame  strategy  is a sequence  of functions  (f’)  izC  r, 
wheref’  determines  a  player’s  choice  of action  at  period  t  as a function  of 
the  previous  t -  I  outcomes 
In  the  standard  supergame  a player  has  to  choose  a supergame  strategy. 
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2.2.  Moore  Machines 
A  Moore  machine  for  player  i,  denoted  Mi,  is  a  four-tuple 
(Q,  qp, ;li,  pi),  where  Qi  is  a  finite  set,  qp E Qj,  ii:  Qi  --f Si,  and 
,u~: Qi  x Sj +  Qi  (j#  i).  The  set  Qi  is  the  set  of  the  internal  states  of  the 
machine  Mi.  The  state  qp is the  initial  state.  The  element  Ai  is a strategy 
in  the  game  G  that  player  i chooses  whenever  his  machine  is  at  state  qi. 
The  function  ,LL~  is called  a  transition  function.  If  the  machine  is  at  state  qi 
and  the  other  player  chooses  sj E Sj  then  the  machine’s  next  internal  state  is 
Pi(4i9  sj). 
Given  the  players  choose  machines  M,  and  M,  the  supergame  is  played 
as follows:  At  the  first  period  the  machine  of  player  i  starts  at  the  state 
qf =  qp.  Player  i chooses  of =  Ai  E Sj.  In  the  second  period  the  machine 
of player  i  moves  into  the  state  q: =  pi(qf,  3;)  (j  #  i). In  general,  given  that 
the  machines  are  at  period  t  at  the  states  q;  and  q;,  player  i  chooses 
sj =  Ai  E Si  and  at  period  t  +  1 his  state  is q: + ’ =  pi(ql,  $).  Thus  a pair  of 
machines  generates  deterministically  a  sequence  of  G’s  outcomes, 
(st,, s;);“,i,  and  a seuquence  of pairs  of states,  (qi,  q;)y=  1. 
2.3. Examples 
The  following  is  a  list  of examples  of machines  which  carry  out  familiar 
strategies  in  the  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma.  Diagrams,  called  transition 
diagrams,  are  used  to  illustrate  the  machines.  The  vertices  of the  diagram 
correspond  to  the  states.  One  of the  states  is  indicated  to  be  the  starting 
point.  A  letter  C  (or  D)  on  an  arch  connecting  the  state  q to  the  state  q’ 
means  that  given  that  the  machine  is at  state  q and  the  other  player’s  move 
C  (or  D)  is observed,  the  machine’s  state  is changed  to  q’. The  letter  below 
the  circle  of a state  q indicates  the  value  of the  I  function  of the  machine  at 
the  state  q. 
(a)  The  one-state  machine  diagrammed  in  Fig.  3 plays  C  constantly: 
Q=  (8%  cl0 =  4*,  4q”)  =  c,  and  ‘44*,  . ) =  q”, 
(b)  The  two-states  machine  represented  in  Fig.  4  carries  out  the  “tit 
for  tat”: 
Q = (qc, qD),  q” = qc,  4q,)  = s,  and  p(q, s) = qs  for  s =  C, D. 
C,  D 
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(c)  The  “grim  strategy”  (play  C  as long  as the  other  player  plays  C) 
is  executed  by  the  machine  diagrammed  in  Fig.  5: 
(d)  The  strategy  to  play  C until  the  other  player  plays  D  and  then  to 
punish  him  for  three  periods  before  returning  to  the  cooperative  behavior 
needs  at  least  a four-states  machine  (see Fig.  6): 
Q=~PI,P~,P~),  q'=q,  J-(q)=C  ~P/J=D  (h =  1, 2, 3), 
dq,C)=q,  dq,D)=p,,  PL(P~,.)=P~+,,  (h=L2),  and  P(P~,.)-cI. 
2.4.  The  Solution  Concept 
Let  M,  and  M,  be  a  pair  of  machines  for  the  two  players.  Let 
q’=  (q;,  q;),  t =  1, 2 )...  be  the  sequence  of  states  of  the  machines  and 
s’=  (s:,  s;),  t =  1, 2,...  be  the  sequence  of  actual  plays  of  the  supergame. 
Since  the  machines  are  finite  there  is  a  minimal  t2  and  1, >  f,,  such  that 
q’l=qf2+1.  Thus  at  period  t,  +  1 the  pair  of states  repeats  itself  for  the  first 
time.  I  refer  to  the  finite  sequence  (qi,...,  q’l-  ‘)  as the  introductory  part  of 
the  play  by  (M,,  M2)  and  to  the  finite  sequence  (qf’,..~, 4”)  as the  cycle  of 
the  play  of  the  pairs  (M,,  M2).  The  length  of the  cycle  is  denoted  by  T, 
T=  t,  -  t,  +  1. 
Define  the  supergame  payoff  of  player  i  as  the  average  payoff  in  the 
cycle,  i.e., 
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Let  M=  (Q,  q”,  1, p)  be a machine.  Denote  by  1441 the  number  of states 
in  Q;  for  q E Q  denote  by  M(q)  the  machine  (Q,  q, 1, p),  that  is  the 
machine  M  starting  at  the  state  q. Let  >L  be the  lexicographic  order  on  [w2. 
Define 
Thus  the  pair  of machines  (M,,  M2)  is preferred  by  player  i  to  the  pair  of 
machines  (%r,  A,)  if player  i achieves  in  (M,,  M2)  a higher  average  payoff 
or  if he  gets  the  same  average  payoff  using  a machine  with  less states. 
The  pair  (MT,  Mz)  is said  to  be  a Nash  equilibrium  if there  is  no  M,  or 
M,  such  that  (M,,  M2)>i  (MT,  M;)  or  (MT,  M,)  >2  (M:,  44:).  The 
main  definition  in  this  paper  is the  following: 
DEFINITION.  A  pair  of machines  (AI,*,  MC)  is  a semi-perfect-equilibrium 
(SPE)  if  there  is  no  time  t,  no  M,  ,  and  no  M,  such  that 
(Ml,  WYcG))  >I  (WYq;),  wY4;)) 
or 
(Mf(q;),  M2)  >2  (W(d),  WYq;)). 
(Recall  that  q:  is  the  state  of MT  at  period  t where  the  game  is  played  by 
the  pair  of machines  (M:,  M:).) 
Thus  in  a  SPE  there  is  no  stage  of the  play  of the  game  after  which  one 
of  the  players  prefers  to  change  his  machine.  The  SPE  differs  from  the 
Nash  equilibrium  concept  in  the  requirement  that  the  machine  M”  be 
optimal  for  player  i against  A&j* not  only  at  the  beginning  of the  game  but 
also  at  the  start  of each  repetition.  The  additional  requirements  are  in  the 
spirit  of  Selten’s  subgame  perfection  and  the  idea  of  dynamically  con- 
sistency.  However  notice  that  the  option  of  replacing  the  machine  is  not 
modelled  as a part  of the  game.  It  appears  only  in  the  solution  concept  and 
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2.5.  A  Discussion  of  the  Solution  Concept 
(a)  The  Restriction  of  Strategies  to  Finite  Automata 
The  players  are  restricted  to  play  the  repeated  game  with  finite 
automata.  By  itself  this  requirement  is  quite  weak.  consider  again  the 
repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma.  For  every  rational  convex  combination 
El,  a2>  a3>  a49  such  that 
(u,,  u2)  =  %a  2)  +  a,@,  0) +  6(3,  -  1) +  CL4  -  123) 3  (0, 0) 
there  exists  a pair  of machines  (M,,  M2)  such  that 
and  none  of  the  players  can  deviate  and  achieve  a  higher  average  payoff 
even  by  using  a strategy  which  cannot  be executed  by  a finite  machine.  The 
machines  follow  the  well-known  Folk  theorem’s  equilibrium:  they  play 
(C,  C)  N,  times,  (D,  D)  N2  times,  (D,  C)  N3  times,  and  (C,  D)  N4  times, 
where  xh =  N,/N,  N  =  ci  = 1 Nh.  After  N  periods  they  start  again  from  the 
beginning.  Where  player  i deviates,  the  other  player,  j,  responds  by  moving 
to  an  absorbing  state  q where  Aj(q)  =  D  and  ~~(4,  ) =  q. Note  that  this  pair 
of machines  is  not  SPE  since  given  that  player  i  is  using  M,,  the  other 
player,  j,  can  achieve  the  average  payoff  uj even  with  a machine  which  does 
not  include  the  punishment  state. 
(b)  A  Comparison  with  Nash  Equilibrium 
The  “trigger”  strategies  as well  as the  “tit  for  tat”  strategies  are  not  even 
Nash  equilibria  in  the  machines  game  since  they  include  states  which  are 
never  used. If  both  players  use the  machines  of Fig.  5, for  example,  then  the 
state  q.  is  not  used  and  each  player  is  able  to  drop  this  state  without 
affecting  the  supergame  payoff. 
The  definition  of SPE  requires  further  that  a solution  includes  only  states 
which  are  used  infinitely  often. 
consider  the  machine  for  the  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma  which  is 
represented  by  Fig.  7.  If  both  players  use  this  machine,  we  get  a  pair  of 
machines  which  is  a  Nash  Equilibrium  and  which  is  not  SPE.  Here,  the 
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punishment  phase  is  used  in  the  introductory  part  of the  play  before  the 
players  reach  the  cycle. The  instability  of this  pair  of machines  is due  to  the 
ability  of the  players  to  drop  the  state  q1  after  the  first  period.  From  the 
point  of view of period  2  the  state  q1 is redundant. 
(c)  Threats  in  SPE 
The  definition  of  SPE  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  players 
threatening  their  opponents.  However,  the  punishment  should  have  the 
feature  that  it  could  be  executed  through  states  of the  machine  which  will 
be  used  anyway  in  the  regular  course  of the  game. 
The  idea  is  that  if  threatening  demands  resources,  and  in  equilibrium 
they  are  not  exercised,  then  it  is  not  optimal  to  hold  the  threats  unless  the 
threatening  machinery  has  some  other  functions  as well. 
The  above  considerations  have  some  similarity  to  phenomena  frequently 
observed  in  real  life:  social  institutions,  various  types  of organizations,  and 
human  abilities  degenerate  or  are  readily  discarded  if  they  are  not  used 
regularly. 
(d)  The  Trade-off  Between  the  Supergame  Payoff  and  the  Procedural  Costs 
A  more  natural  model  might  allow  a  real  trade-off  between  the 
supergame  payoff  and  the  procedural  costs.  Here  a  most  extreme  case is 
studied.  The  players  care  lexicographically  primarily  about  the  average 
payoff  and  only  secondarily  about  the  measure  of  complexity  of  the 
machine.  This  is  done  mainly  for  the  sake  of  simplicity.  It  is  an 
approximation  of  a  situation  in  which  the  magnitude  of  the  procedural 
costs  is  small  relative  to  the  supergame  payoff.  The  strength  of  this 
assumption  is  that  it  allows  a  deviating  player  to  achieve  a  higher  payoff 
even  using  a  very  complicated  machine. 
(e)  The  MeasuFe  of  Complexity 
The  measure  of complexity  of  a machine  which  is  used  in  this  paper  is 
the  number  of states  held  in  the  machine.  This  measure  remain  the  measure 
for  complexity  throughout  the  course  of the  game.  Thus,  for  example,  it  is 
not  cheaper  to  maintain  states  if they  were used  in  the  past.  The  definition 
of SPE  is motivated  by  the  scenario  described  in  the  introduction.  A player 
“pays”  a  “very  small”  fee per  state  per  period  that  the  state  is  held  in  its 
machine.  Operating  the  machine  with  less  states  is  desirable  since  it  saves 
future  costs  associated  with  maintaining  the  extra  states. 
As mentioned  earlier  the  measure  of complexity  used  here  is very  naive. 
Other  possible  complexity  measures  may  take  into  account  the  complexity 
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3.  PROPERTIES OF  SPE 
In  this  section  two  properties  of  SPE  are  proved.  First,  we shall  show 
that  during  a  cycle  no  player  will  repeat  the  same  states  twice.  Note  that 
the  “memory”  of a  player  is embedded  in  the  name  of the  state.  This  con- 
clusion  means,  therefore,  that  at  a  solution  each  player  keeps  track  of his 
exact  position  in  the  cycle. 
Second,  we shall  show that  in  a solution  there  is full  coordination  in  tim- 
ing  the  switching  of  the  one-shot  game  strategies.  Whenever  one  player 
changes  his  strategy,  the  other  player  changes  his  strategy  too.  This  fact  has 
a  clear  implication  to  repeated  2 x 2  matrix  games,  in  which  case  at  a 
solution  the  G-outcomes  are  all  on  one  of the  matrix’s  two  diagonals. 
In  the  following,  let  (MT,  M:  )  be  a  pair  of  machines  with  a  cycle 
(q”,...,  q*?). Denote  ni(M:,  Mf)  by  7-r:. Given  two  number  k  and  1 between 
t1 and  t,,  define  the  set T(k,  1) s  (t1,...,  t2}  as the  set of periods  from  k  to  i 
in  the  oriented  cycle  from  t,  to  t2;  that  is, 
T(k’  I)=  i 
(k,  k  +  l,...,  1;  k  6  I, 
{k,  k+  l,...,  t,,  t,,  t,  +  I,...,  I>  k  >  1. 
Let  A j(k,  I)  be  i’s  average  payoff  in  T(k,  1). 
PROPOSITION  1.  If  (MT,  MT)  is  a solution  then: 
(a)  For  all  i,  the  states  qi’,...,  qf2 are  distinct. 
(b)  For  all  t>  tl,  A~(q~)=A~(q:+‘)  ifand  only  if1~~(q~)=A.“(q~+‘). 
The  proof  of the  proposition  is  divided  into  three  simple  Lemmas: 
LEMMA  1.  Ifq:l=q:?forsomet,~k,<kl~t2thenAz(k,,kz-L)=n~. 
frooJ  Assume  that  A,(k,,  k,-  1) >n,*.  (A  similar  proof  is  needed  for 
the  case  where  A,(k,,  k?-  1) <  7~;).  Let  us  define  a  machine,  M2,  for 
player  2 such  that  rc,(Mf,  MJ  =  A,(k,,  kz  -  1). The  machine  M2  includes 
k2 -  1  states  pl,...,  p k2~1  Its  initial  state  is  p’.  The  function  &  of  the 
machine  Mz  mimics  M;j  that  is,  &(pk)  =  .&(&)  for  all  1 <k  <  k,  -  1. 33~ 
transition  function,  pLz, satisfies  pL2(pk, r2:(qf))  =  pk’  i  for  k  < k2  -  1  and 
j.&F-  i, A::(qP-  l )) =  pkl.  Clearly  the  cycle  of  (MT,  ?)  is  ((q’;],  phi),...> 
(q/;2-l,  pkZpl))  and  z2(Mf,  M2)=Az(k1,  k,-  l)>n,“. 
LEMMA  2.  For  all  i and  for  all  t,  <k,  <k,  <  t,,  qfil # qt?. 
Proof  Let  (k, h)  be  the  lexicographically  minimal  pair  of  integers 
k >  k -  h =  12  t,,  such that  there  exists  a player  i satisfying  qf = qf.  Assume 
that  i =  1; q$ #  q’;,  otherwise  the  cycle  is  shorter.  The  number  of the  states 
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of M;  is  at  least  h +  1  unless  k  =  t,  +  1. Next  define  an  h-state  machine, 
M1,  ensuring  that  rc2(MF,  M2)  =  A,(Z, k  -  1)  (and  by  Lemma  1 also  equal 
to  rrt).  The  machine  M,  includes  the  states  p’,...,  pk-‘.  The  function  A2 
satisfies  A,(pj)  =  A;(&  and  the  transition  function  ,u2  satisfies 
/b(Pl  mq:))  =  P’+  l f or j<  k  -  1 and  ,u2(pk-‘,  Af(q”-‘))  =  p’.  The  initial 
state  of M,  is p’.  The  cycle of (Mf(qi),  M2)  is  ((q:,  qi),...,  (qifhel,  qi+ “-I)) 
and  thus  n,*(Mf(qi),  M2)  =  n;  as  long  as  k#tZ+l,  IM,(<lM:/, 
therefore,  k  =  t2 +  1 and  qfl#  qp  for  all  t,  6 kl  <k,  <  tz  and  for  all  i. 
LEMMA  3.  There  is  no j>  t,  such  that  A,Y(q{)  #  ilF(q{+  ‘)  and  A.:(q{)  = 
Q(qif’). 
ProoJ:  If  otherwise,  player  2  would  deviate  at  t,  by  a  machine  M, 
which  satisfies  rc2(MT,  M2)  =  7~;  and  IM,l  <  IMT(.  The  machine  includes 
all  the  states  of  Mz  with  the  exception  of  qj+  I.  The  initial  state  of  M, 
is  qg  if j#  t2,  and  is  q;*  if j=  t2.  The  function  &  is  as  Q.  The  transition 
function  of  M2  is  modified  from  ,u;  such  that  ,u2(q{,  AI(  =  qi  and 
p2(qj2, A,(q{+l))  =  q;+2.  Note  the  simple  idea  behind  the  proof.  In  M; 
player  2 uses qi+  l  only  for  counting  the  periods.  Since  player  1 is behaving 
differently  in  periods  j  and j+  1, player  2 could  avoid  the  need  to  use qi+  1 
and  instead  rely  on  the  “free”  service  that  player  1  provides  him  by 
switching  from  A;“(q()  to  A,*(q{+‘). 
4.  THE  REPEATED  PRISONER'S DILEMA 
In  this  section,  Proposition  1 is  used  for  characterizing  the  SPE  payoffs 
in  the  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma. 
PROPOSITION  2.  The  pair  (z.$, 7~;)  is  a  solution’s  payoff  if  and  only  iJ 
(C>  IE;)  =  (0,O)  or  where  there  is  a rational  number  a such  that  (x,Y,  rcf)  = 
c((3, -  1) +  (1 -  a)( -  1,3)  >  (0,O). 
Proof  Let  us start  with  the  “necessary”  part.  Assume  that  (M:,  M:)  is 
a  solution  such  that  rcj(M,*,  Mz)=  n”.  If  7~” GO  then  M,?  must  be  the 
single  state  machine  which  plays  D  constantly.  In  such  a  case M,*  must  be 
the  same  as MT  and  (z:,  7~:) =  (0,O). 
After  the  introductory  part  the  outcomes  must,  according  to 
Proposition  1,  include  (C,  C)  and  (D,  D)  only  or  (C,  D)  and  (D,  C)  only. 
Assume  that  in  the  cycle  only  (C,  C)  and  (D,  D)  are played  and  that  (C,  C) 
is  played  in  the  cycle  at  least  once.  Let  k,  satisfy  the  condition  that 
(A:(qfl),  @(q$l))  =  (C,  C).  Let  k^,  satisfy  that  ,uz(qil,  D)  =  qp+l.  Then 
A,(k,  +  1, c2)  >  nf,  since  otherwise  Ar(ff,  +  1, k,)>  n4  and  player  1  can 
deviate  profitably  by  making  the  change  in  MT  such  that  l,(q/;l)  =  D  and FINITE  AUTOMATA  95 
p&7;‘, C) = &+  I.  Since  A,(k,+l,k^,)>7r~>O,  we  can  choose 
k,,  k,  +  1 <  k2 GE2  to  satisfy  that  Al(k,  +  1, k,)  >  n:  and  (Ar(q/;l), 
g(qp))  =  (C,  C). 
In  the  same  way  we can  continue  to  choose  a  sequence  k,  5  k,,  k,,  k,,...  . 
Because  of the  finite  number  of states  in  the  machines  we eventually  reach 
ifm  such  that  k,=  k,.  Then  the  contradiction  to  nl(M,*,  Mz)=rc:  is 
straightforward. 
Finally,  let  us turn  to  the  sufficiency  part  of the  proposition.  Let  N1  and 
N,  be  two  natural  numbers  such  that  (n:,  nt)  =  (¶/N)[N,(3,  -  1) + 
NA  -  L3)1>  C&O),  w  h ere  N  =  N,  +  N,.  Let  us  construct  a  solution  (see 
Fig.  8)  whereby  in  the  course  of  its  cycle  the  players  will  play  (D,  C) 
N,  times  and  (C,  D)  N2  times.  Define  M:=  (Q:,  4;,  A:,  pf),  QF= 





1  ’ 
s,=D;  kdNl, 
/Gvql;,  s*)=  q:+  l,  s2 =  c;  k<N,, 
k+  l(modh’) 
41  s2=C,  D;  N,<k<N. 
Similarly  define  Mz.  Clearly  (MT,  A@)  has  the  desired  N  periods  cycle 
and  neither  of the  players  can  deviate  and  increase  his  average  payoff.  Let 
us verify  that  for  a player  to  achieve  of” he  needs  a machine  with  at  least  N 
states. 
Assume  that  M,  is a machine  for  player  2 such  that  xJMJ=,  M,)  =  n;.  It 
follows  that  the  length  of the  cycle  of the  play  of the  game  by  MF  and  M, 
is at  least  N.  Player  1 must  play  C in  the  cycle  at  least  once.  Therefore,  Mf 
reaches  one  of  the  states  q;YI+l,...,  q;Y  at  least  once  during  the  cycle  of 
(MT,  M,).  Due  to  the  structure  of  MT  it  must  pass  sequentially  through 
the  block  [qyl+  I,..., q;Y].  In  order  to  return  to  qrl  + L it  has  to  go  through 
all  the  states  [qf,...,  q;Yl].  Therefore  the  sequence  of player  l’s  states  in  the 
cycle of (M:,  M2)  must  each be  composed  of blocks  of the  type  [si  ,..., qflj 
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[q:  ,..., qp]  ,..., [q:  ,..., q:‘]  [q;“”  l,.,.,  q;Yl,  where  1 <k,  ,..., k,d  N,  and 
k, =  N,.  In  this  way  player  2  can  only  meet  the  average  nz  by  ensuring 
that  player  1 will  use his  states  in  the  cycle  in  blocks  of 
cq:,...,  4;y’l cq;y’+  l,...,  4y1. 
For  this  a  necessary  requirement  for  M,  is  that  player  2  plays  C 
whenever  l’s  state  is  one  from  among  qj,...,  q;Y’ and  for  achieving  the 
average  7~;  player  1 must  play  D  whenever  l’s  state  is  taken  from  among 
NI  +  1 
41 
N 
,...,  91  . 
Let  [PI,...,  pN]  be the  states  of M2  which  are  used  by  player  2 parallel  to 
one  of the  appearances  of a series of states  [qf  ,..., qrl]  [qf’l+  ‘,..., q;Y] in  the 
plays  of the  game.  Clearly  pN’ #  pN1+l.  Therefore,  pNIP1 # pN1 since  they 
compel  different  ,u-responses  to  the  choice  of  C  by  player  1, 
L4PN’ - I,  C) =  pN’ while  p2(pN1,  C) =  pN’+ ‘.  Since  1,  differs  on  pNI-’  and 
P  N~+l  it  also  follows  that  pN’-’  # pN’+ ‘. Repeating  this  argument  it  is easy 
to  show that  all  (ph)fcl  are  different. 
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